the foundation for future autonomous transport systems [7] . Meanwhile, lack of secure communications between vehicles might result in abuses or attacks, which can jeopardize ITS efficiency and threaten driving safety [8] . This motivates the research on vehicular communications from the perspective of communication security.
Due to the high mobility of vehicles, the well-known channel models such as Rayleigh, Rician or Nakagami-m, which were initially proposed for stationary communication links, do not fit well for a lot of V2V channel measurements [9] [10] [11] . Instead, double Rayleigh fading has been proposed as a more precise characterization of the dynamic non line-of-sight (NLOS) vehicular links based on both field measurement and theoretical analysis in [9] [10] [11] and the references therein, where the double-bounce scattering components caused by scatterers around both the transmitter's and receiver's local environments lead to a cascaded Rayleigh fading processes [11] . Additionally, it has been shown that double Rayleigh distribution also fits various measurements in different suburban outdoor-to-indoor mobile-to-mobile (M2M) communication scenarios as well as for keyhole channels [12] .
Motivated by the latest advances in physical layer security analysis [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] and the importance of security in vehicular communications, we study the secrecy performance of vehicular communications in this letter. Additionally, due to the high mobility of vehicles, and more importantly, the eavesdropper's intention to hide its position, we also take into account of the uncertainty of the eavesdropper's location in our analysis. We represent the location uncertainty with a parameter pair, which enables us to gain more insights on the impact of location uncertainty on the secrecy performance compared to previous results. To the best of the authors' knowledge, the secrecy performance of double Rayleigh fading channel has not been studied from the physical layer perspective, nor can it be approximated by those of other investigated fading distributions [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . More specifically, we investigate the secrecy performance of the Wyner's model in the scenario of V2V communications under eavesdropper location uncertainty.
Notations: II. CHANNEL AND SYSTEM MODELS We consider the classical Wyner's wiretap model in our analysis [3] . Under Wyner's model, the vehicle S sends confidential information to the desired receiver D (another moving vehicle in V2V scenario) whereas the eavesdropper vehicle E tries to intercept the information by decoding its received signal. It assumed that the communication links for V2V communications experience independent double Rayleigh fading and the distance for the legitimate communication (between nodes S and D) is known to S. We also consider the realistic scenario of eavesdropping that the exact distance for the eavesdropper link (between nodes S and E) is unknown to S due to the vehicle mobility and node E's intention to hide its exact position; but S has the information that the position of node E is located between ranges R 1 and R 2 with equal probability. In V2V scenario, R 1 can be interpreted as the minimum distance between vehicles to ensure safety or the range of protected zone as proposed in [6] while the upper limit R 2 is the maximum transmission distance due to S's coverage limit.
The received signal at node X, X ∈ {D, E}, is expressed as
where x represents the transmitted signal with energy E s , h X represents the channel between node S and node X, n denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with power spectral density N 0 , which, without loss of generality, is assumed to be the same for both links. Incorporating the effects of small-scale fading and path loss, the channel gain for transmission distance d X between nodes S and X can be further expressed as follows [14] :
where g X represents the channel gain following double Rayleigh distribution and α denotes the path loss exponent.
III. SECRECY CAPACITY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. Distributions of Instantaneous SNRs
From (2), the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) received at node X, X ∈ {D, E}, can be expressed as
With g X being double Rayleigh distributed, the probability density function (PDF) f |g X | 2 (x ) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) F |g X | 2 (x ) of the random variable (RV) |g X | 2 are given by [15] 
of the instantaneous SNR γ D can be readily derived by applying the change of RVs and written as [15] 
For instantaneous SNR γ E , besides the double Rayleigh fading, the random location of the node E should also be taken into account while deriving the distribution functions.
Proposition 1: The CDF F γ E (γ) of the instantaneous SNR γ E received by node E given that its distance to node S is any distance between R 1 and R 2 with equal probability, can be closely approximated numerically by the expression in (6) , shown at the bottom of the next page, where w ι and t ι are the weights and abscissas detailed in [16, eq. (25.4 
.30)].
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
B. Average Secrecy Capacity
The instantaneous secrecy capacity of the considered system is defined as C s = max{ln(1 + γ D ) − ln(1 + γ E ), 0} [2] . The average secrecy capacity C s can be obtained from [17] 
Substituting (5) and (6) into (7) and utilizing the following transformations: (8), the ASC under the eavesdropper location uncertainty is bounded by the first term, which is only related to the legitimate node D. Indeed, the ASC is always less than the capacity of the legitimate channel capacity. The second term of (8) demonstrates the impact of the location uncertainty of node E on the ASC, where the parameter
represents the mean uncertainty range and
denotes the mean distance to the source node S. From (8), the effects of eavesdropper's location uncertainty on the ASC can be readily evaluated. The above derived expressions provide the average secrecy capacity and distribution of SNR γ E in general cases. Next, we consider the following special cases to provide more insights.
Lemma 1: When the node S gains information on the exact position of node E, i.e., mathematically (8), the ASC C s can be expressed as
where a = 2
of the SNR γ E will have the same form as that in (5 
where
Remark 2: Rewriting (15) leads to the following expression:
dxdy. (11) Noticing that both integrals in (11) are consistent, we can conclude that the asymptotic ASC follows the scaling law of Θ(ln(ρ 1 )) (namely Θ ln 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
For the purpose of numerical evaluation, we adopt the following simulation parameters: unless stated otherwise, node D is d D = 3 m away from node S, node E is located somewhere between R 1 = 4 m and R 2 = 12 m away from S. Figure 1 shows the ASC as a function of the transmit SNR E s /N 0 for different values of path loss exponent assuming that the location of E is known to S. It can be observed that the ASC performance can be improved by increasing the transmit SNR within the low transmit SNR region, whereas the transmit SNR has a limited impact on the ASC in the high transmit SNR region, which is clearly independent of the transmit SNR and is theoretically verified in Lemma 2. This reveals that the secrecy capacity limit does not depend on the transmit SNR but the relative locations of the nodes, which is confirmed in Fig. 2 . Figure 2 illustrates the ASC versus and mean uncertainty distance
the ratio
in the first subplot as well as the scaling law of the asymptotic ASC with respect to ln
in the second subplot. Figure 3 depicts the ASC versus the path loss exponent with fixed values of input SNR. It is clear that a monotonic increasing or decreasing relationship does not necessarily hold between the ASC and the path loss exponent for fixed E s /N 0 values. This is due to the fact that secrecy capacity depends on the capacity difference of the legitimate and eavesdropper channels even though greater values of path loss exponent indicate less capacity for both channels. Figure 4 illustrates the impact of the eavesdropper location uncertainty on the ASC performance. It is concluded that when the uncertainty on E's location decreases (i.e., smaller values of
), the uncertainty of node E's received SNR decreases; therefore, the ASC increases, which is also in accordance with the results in [6] . Also, as the node E is statistically located further (i.e., greater values of
), the ASC increases. Additionally, it is observed that under the condition of eavesdropper location uncertainty, the uncertainty range
poses a greater impact on the ASC when the mean uncertainty distance
is small. The results imply the importance of taking into account the uncertainty of
eavesdropper's location while designing V2V communication systems with PLS.
V. CONCLUSION In this letter, the physical layer secrecy capacity over double Rayleigh fading channels were derived and analyzed. The obtained results can be used for the secrecy capacity analysis for V2V and M2M communications as well as for keyhole channels.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 We first derive the CDF of RV |h E | 2 with location uncertainty of E for S. The CDF F |h E | 2 (x ) of the RV |h E | 2 is related to the CDF F |g E | 2 (·) of RV |g E | 2 shown in (4) as follows [5] :
Expressing the modified Bessel function using Meijer Gfunction [13, eq. (9. 34)] and applying the Gauss-Legendre quadrature technique [16, eq. (25.4.30 (12) can be approximated by (13) can converge rapidly as L increases and only limited terms are required to get satisfactory accuracy.
Finally, utilizing the first equality of (3) in (13), we obtain the CDF F γ E (γ) of the SNR γ E as in Proposition 1.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The ASC can be alternatively expressed as [3] 
For notational simplicity, we make the following changes of RVs:
, and y = |h E | 2 ; and the SNRs can be written as: γ D = γ t μx and γ E = γ t νy. Then, the ASC can be expressed after some mathematical manipulations as 
(15) Denoting the first integral in (15) by I 1 and second one by I 2 ; after changing order of integration for I 1 and applying the equality [13, eq. (6.561.4)], we can have
Finally, representing the functions in the (16) and (17) (10) .
In ( 
) dx = 0.5, we can obtain the equality after some straightforward algebra.
